For the KDP and PUK, the next federal election will be decided less by predictable patterns inside the Kurdistan Region than by what happens across the disputed territories. Patronage and party machines keep the home provinces relatively stable; the swing space lies in mixed governorates where a few late quotients can flip the final seat. Iraq’s current system, governorate-wide districts with the modified Sainte-Laguë divisor of 1.7, rewards cohesive lists and punishes fragmented vote pools. In practical terms, each extra 5–10 thousand votes that a party concentrates, rather than scatters across parallel slates, can be the difference between winning and losing the last seat.

Kirkuk is the clearest case of divergence between the two Kurdish rivals. In the 2023 provincial race, the PUK took roughly 157,639 votes and 5 seats, while the KDP managed 52,278 and 2. The scale of that gap reflects longer-run geography and networks: Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salahaddin are historical extensions of PUK influence, with many senior figures hailing from these areas. The KDP did build real traction in parts of Kirkuk up to 2014, but since 2017 its footprint has steadily shrunk.

Nineveh remains the KDP’s pivotal battleground, but the landscape is no longer a simple KDP-versus-everyone-else contest. The PUK has already neutralized much of the fragmentation risk by running as the Nineveh People’s Union Coalition, a cross-community slate that stitches together Kurdish constituencies, Kakais, the Herki tribe, and Yazidis, alongside select Arab tribal figures who proved decisive in the December 2023 provincial vote. In that election, the KDP led the Kurdish field with 141,052 votes and four seats, yet the PUK’s 50,606 votes, channeled through a compact alliance, still translated into two seats. The coalition is now being scaled for parliamentary rules under the modified Sainte-Laguë 1.7 divisor: because Nineveh’s late quotients are often decided by only a few thousand votes, concentrating support on a single PUK-led list sharply improves its odds of taking one seat and keeps two within reach, especially if Arab lists crowd each other on the final divisor rounds. For the KDP, three to four seats remain defensible on current patterns; reaching five or six would require stronger mobilization in Sheikhan, Hamdaniya, and Makhmour, plus a disciplined alliance architecture to limit leakage to parallel Kurdish or minority lists. The KDP has already sought inroads with Arab tribes around Makhmour; given the district’s proximity to Erbil and the party’s administrative reach, its patronage networks now extend into parts of these communities. In short, Nineveh’s outcome will hinge on which side, the KDP’s establishment machine or the PUK’s cross-community list—better avoids wasted votes on the final one or two quotients.

Diyala and Salahaddin remain small Kurdish vote pools. In 2023, the PUK secured 28,648 votes and 1 seat in Diyala and 10,884 votes and 1 seat in Salahaddin; the KDP posted 7,790 (0 seats) and 1,415 (0 seats), respectively.

2025 read-across by governorate

Kirkuk. If 2023 voting patterns hold, the PUK enters 2025 with a strong claim to four seats and a plausible path to five. The KDP’s modal outcome is one seat; two is still possible, but would require (a) disciplined KDP turnout in its remaining precincts and (b) enough Arab/Turkmen fragmentation to open a second Kurdish lane on the final divisor rounds.

Nineveh. The KDP’s core test. Most signs point to three to four seats as defensible today; five to six would demand tighter list discipline plus minority/tribal pacts in Sinjar, the plain, Makhmour, and Sheikhan. The PUK baseline here is zero to one seat; two becomes realistic only if it converts its outreach to Yazidi and Kakai and allied Kurdish and Arab actors into a single competitive list that avoids wasted vote.

Diyala. The PUK retains a credible path to one seat centered on the Khanaqin arc—provided Kurdish votes aren’t split. The KDP remains a long-shot unless the parties coordinate.

Salahaddin. Kurdish totals are too thin for a safe seat. The PUK’s outside chance at one hinges on a pre-arranged partnership with a local Arab list; the KDP is unlikely to score under present patterns.

The pattern inside the Kurdistan Region remains broadly stable: KDP dominant in Duhok and Erbil; PUK resurgent in Sulaimani and Halabja. Those balances affect national totals at the margin, but the gap between the parties in Baghdad will be set by the disputed territories.

The 2021 split—KDP 31 vs. PUK 17, remains the reference point. On present evidence from the 2023 provincial vote and under the modified Sainte-Laguë (1.7) formula, the KDP’s in-Region expectation is Erbil 8–10, Duhok 9–10, Sulaymani 2–3 (≈19–23 seats), while in the disputed territories of Nineveh 4–5, Kirkuk 1–2, Diyala 0–1, Salahaddin 0 yields a national range of 24–31, with a central landing around 27–29; reaching ≥30 requires the top end across both tracks, roughly 23 inside the Kurdistan Region plus Nineveh 5 and Kirkuk 2 (and possibly Diyala 1).

For the PUK, the core path remains Kirkuk 4–5 and Diyala 1, with Nineveh 0–2 via its consolidated slate; additionally, Salahaddin 0–1 is now a credible scenario given a PUK-backed nominee on a competitive Arab list, nudging the national band to 18–22. This arithmetic narrows the 2021 gap (+14) to roughly +5 to +10 in the central case; it slips toward single digits if the PUK converts a late quotient in Nineveh or adds Salahaddin 1, and widens only if the KDP hits the Nineveh 5 + Kirkuk 2 best case.

The KDP remains the leading Kurdish party, but its margin now runs through Nineveh and a contested second seat in Kirkuk. The PUK’s path to meaningful gains is clear—defend Kirkuk, bank a seat in Diyala, and turn outreach in Nineveh into a single, vote-efficient list. Under the 1.7 Sainte-Laguë method, the final seat in each of these governorates is likely to be won or lost by a few thousand votes – and with it, the width of the KDP–PUK gap in the next Iraqi Parliament.