The leader of Turkey’s MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, a key ally of President Erdoğan, has said that the SDF must “very soon” decide whether it remains loyal to the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan or becomes part of what he described as the Israeli project in Syria. A Turkish parliamentary commission formed to address the legal framework for a peace process with the PKK is set to meet Öcalan in prison, with the SDF question at the center of discussions.

Context: As part of the peace process taking place primarily between Öcalan from his prison cell and the Turkish state, a group of PKK militants laid down their arms on July 11, and a parliamentary commission was formed on July 30 to pave the way for legal reforms as part of the process. However, the SDF, which signed an agreement to integrate with the new Syrian government on March 10—widely seen as linked to the broader PKK settlement—has left implementation on paper. Bahçeli, who has maintained a soft tone throughout the process, is now threatening military action against the SDF if it doesn’t abide by the agreement and integrate into the new Syrian government. As the process slows, Bahçeli met with Erdoğan to discuss the next steps in relations to the process.

Analysis: One of the driving reasons behind Turkey’s new peace initiative with the PKK last year is believed to be linked to the regional shifts following October 7, 2023 — developments that led to the collapse of Iran’s regional axis and the parallel rise of Israel. Last year, which also coincided with the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish state through Bahçeli started a peace process with the PKK that caught everyone off guard.

Few details have since been publicized about the nature and content of the discussions with Öcalan, though leaked prison notes suggest that Israel’s growing influence is a central theme. Öcalan—with his history of anti-Israeli sentiment—appears to be on the same page with Erdoğan and Bahçeli about preventing Israeli regional domination.

The new peace process therefore seems built on two key ideas: 1. A strategic shift in Ankara’s worldview: For the first century of the Republic, Kurdish issues were the main axis of state policy at home and in the neighborhood. Now, Israel has replaced the Kurds as the core driver of Turkish strategic thinking. 2. Kurds, who have historically been among the closest allies of Turks through Islamic solidarity dating back to the Battle of Manzikert a thousand years ago, should return to this natural alliance given that their regional ambitions now align.

Yet, many Kurds — especially within the PKK’s orbit — remain suspicious. They view the sudden Turkish pivot as opportunistic: softening policy toward Kurds not out of conviction but due to Ankara’s own fragile position.

In this context, Bahçeli’s recent statement in an interview with Hürriyet newspaper is noteworthy. Regarding the SDF, he said: “Very soon it will become clear whether the derivatives of the separatist terrorist organization pass the test of loyalty and sincerity before their leader, or whether Zionist villainy will prevail instead of İmralı [where Öcalan is imprisoned].”

In Ankara’s evolving worldview, Syria is increasingly framed as a choice between Turkey or Israel. Turkish officials believe the March 10 agreement signed by Mazloum Abdi should have been implemented by now, but the SDF’s hesitation may be emboldened by Israel. After the Sweida clashes — in which heavy Israeli airstrikes forced Damascus’s withdrawal and created a de facto Druze region — the SDF gained confidence while U.S. pressure on it to comply with the March agreement eased.

Bahçeli’s statement is paradoxical: on the one hand questioning the SDF’s loyalty to Öcalan, while on the other still accusing it of being the PKK — the very pretext for Turkish intervention in Syria. What makes his framing different this time is the warning that Turkey could intervene militarily if the SDF fails to pass the test of “loyalty and sincerity” to Öcalan. In other words, the rationale for intervention is shifting: previously it was that the SDF was part of the PKK, but now it is that the SDF is not answering to the PKK’s jailed leader, Öcalan.

Yet in Turkish strategic thinking, the issue is not so straightforward. This is why a five-member parliamentary delegation on the peace process is preparing to meet Öcalan in the coming days. So far, Öcalan has committed only to the PKK’s disarmament, resisting efforts to publicly extend this commitment to its regional affiliates such as the SDF in Syria or PJAK in Iran.

For Turkey, the peace process would lose much of its value if the SDF survives intact and consolidates its position in Syria, as this would represent the continued existence of the PKK’s armed wing under another guise. Bahçeli’s remarks should therefore not be dismissed as rhetoric. They reflect a growing conviction in Ankara that the SDF must either align with Öcalan — positioning him as part of a new domestic power-sharing paradigm — or fall into Israel’s regional project in Syria. In Ankara’s eyes, a PKK “derivative” aligned with Israel is far more dangerous than the PKK itself.

For the SDF, however, the calculations are markedly different. Its priority is to survive as a political entity and secure recognition as a federal region within Syria. This pursuit is primarily about preserving its own power, not serving Israel. In fact, the SDF would likely be willing to strike an understanding with Turkey if such a deal guaranteed the continuation of its autonomous structures and authority.