Sipan Hamo, a commander in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has proposed forming a joint military council with the Syrian transitional government, describing it as a first step toward rebuilding “a new national army.” His remarks come as second-tier leadership from the SDF and the Syrian government are expected to resume talks in Damascus over the future of the SDF and northeast Syria.

Context: SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and interim Syrian president Ahmad al-Sharaa signed a US-backed agreement in March stipulating SDF integration into the Syrian Army. The SDF and its civilian arm have called for a decentralized governance system in Syria and have insisted that integration should allow the SDF to join the army as a unified bloc within its current command structure. Meanwhile, the Syrian government maintains that integration means SDF fighters joining the army individually.

Analysis: The current debate about Syria’s future governance is no longer centralization versus decentralization, but rather what type of decentralization will emerge. Much commentary frames this as a debate between centralization and decentralization, but in reality, that question has already been settled. Even figures close to the government, including officials such as Qutaiba Idlibi of the foreign ministry, have stated that Damascus no longer insists on a fully centralized system. Instead, they have expressed openness to decentralization, provided it remains limited to an administrative model. This would allow some local autonomy in areas like education and municipal governance but would stop short of empowering regions with independent political or military authority.

The real dispute lies in determining what kind of decentralization Syria will adopt. For Damascus, two red lines remain non-negotiable, according to a group of Arab journalists who recently met with al-Sharaa:

1. – The northeast cannot retain its own military force separate from the national army.
2. – The region cannot pursue its own foreign policy that might be perceived as separatism.

By contrast, the SDF has until now envisioned decentralization that preserves its existing political and military structures. Its leaders have indicated willingness to join a new Syrian army, but only as a unified bloc while maintaining their cohesion and command structure.

What is new now, as the SDF and Syrian government enter more serious negotiations about the SDF’s future and Syria’s governance, is that the SDF appears to be putting forward an alternative proposal to keeping its own unified bloc. Rather than integrating the SDF, estimated to be a 100,000-strong force, into the currently forming HTS-led army, their new proposal – put forward by Sipan Hamo, long a shadowy figure who led the YPG, the SDF’s backbone, but was kept out of the spotlight due to Turkish sensitivities – suggests the two should merge on equal footing to build a joint military council as a first step toward rebuilding “a new national army that includes all Syrians and is based on a comprehensive democratic project.”

This proposal reflects a strategic shift. The SDF is no longer merely resisting absorption into Damascus’s structures; it is now engaging Damascus on its own terms. By framing the discussion around merger rather than integration, the SDF is effectively saying: if the government does not want parallel armies, then it must negotiate the terms of a joint force, one in which the SDF would become a coequal pillar of a newly reconstituted Syrian army. In this scenario, the SDF positions itself not just as a faction to be dissolved but as a central partner in shaping and ruling the new Syria.