The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) face a critical juncture in their relationship with Damascus, nine months after the collapse of the Assad regime. As part of the current negotiations with Damascus, brokered by the US and France, SDF appears prepared to engage in strategic territorial concessions as part of a broader negotiation for recognition and autonomy. This analysis examines the SDF’s likely negotiating position, the constraints facing all parties, and the complex dynamics that make a purely military solution problematic for Damascus and Ankara.

What the SDF May—and May Not—Concede

The SDF leadership has made clear, both in rhetoric and through its actions, that it will not surrender its foundational structure. Its vision includes maintaining a unified fighting force, a decentralized administrative model, and substantial autonomy in Kurdish-majority areas. However, this commitment does not necessarily extend to every inch of territory currently under its control.

The most vulnerable point in the SDF-held territory is Deir ez-Zor, an Arab-majority region in eastern Syria plagued by unrest, assassinations, and armed resistance against the SDF’s rule. Given the political and security costs, the SDF may be willing to cede Deir ez-Zor as part of a larger agreement—possibly in exchange for formal recognition of its authority in core Kurdish areas and a decentralized governance model under a unified Syrian framework.

In contrast, Raqqa appears to be a different story. Despite being an Arab-majority city, Raqqa holds strategic and symbolic value as the former capital of ISIS and a key node in connecting Kurdish-majority areas such as Kobani, Qamishli, and the Jazira region. The SDF’s reported fortification efforts, including tunnel construction, suggest it is preparing for long-term defense rather than withdrawal.

The Viability Question: Kurdish Pockets Without Arab Lands

This leads to a structural dilemma. Kurdish-majority areas in Syria are geographically fragmented—stretched across disconnected zones like Kobani, Qamishli, and Afrin. Without Arab-majority areas like Raqqa or parts of Hasakah province, any future Kurdish autonomous region risks being territorially incoherent and economically unsustainable.

While a pan-Kurdish conference in April endorsed a vision of decentralization focused on Kurdish areas, this approach alone offers limited viability. It falls short of the SDF’s broader ambitions to govern a contiguous and functional autonomous zone—one that could support a political, administrative, and military infrastructure. Giving up Raqqa or even parts of Arab Hasakah would make that vision far less attainable.

The SDF is often seen as a Kurdish-led force, but approximately 60% of its fighters are Arab, mostly drawn from tribal militias and local recruits. Its core, however, remains the 30,000–40,000 Kurdish fighters who are ideologically committed and militarily seasoned. Many Arab elements are more pragmatic and less ideologically aligned with the SDF’s long-term goals. If U.S. support weakens or Arab communities reach side agreements with Damascus, these Arab units could peel away—posing a risk of fragmentation from within.

Why Military Solutions Remain Problematic

The new Syrian government in Damascus faces significant obstacles to pursuing a purely military approach against the SDF. Ahmad al-Sharaa’s administration is engaged in a delicate process of image rehabilitation, seeking international legitimacy while distancing itself from his al-Qaeda past. This effort is crucial for securing the lifting of U.S. sanctions, which is necessary to enable Syria’s reconstruction and economic recovery—without which al-Sharaa’s rule may collapse. A prolonged conflict with the SDF would draw precisely the kind of negative international attention that could derail these efforts, particularly given the strong support for Kurdish forces in the U.S. Congress.

Unlike previous operations against weakened Assad regime remnants or local militias in Suwayda, the SDF represents a capable, motivated fighting force with extensive defensive preparations. Military operations would likely prove lengthy and costly, drawing unwanted scrutiny from international observers and potentially triggering broader regional complications. The Syrian government appears to recognize these constraints, preferring indirect strategies such as supporting tribal militias or encouraging Arab defections from the SDF rather than direct confrontation.

Turkey faces its own complex calculations despite possessing clear military superiority over Kurdish forces. Ankara’s improving relationship with the Trump administration creates strong incentives to avoid actions that might trigger Congressional retaliation or renewed sanctions. Several of Turkey’s critical defense projects depend on international collaboration, particularly with the United States and Europe, while Turkey’s economy remains deeply integrated into Western markets and is just recovering from recent inflationary pressures. These economic vulnerabilities make military intervention a potentially costly proposition that extends far beyond immediate battlefield considerations.

U.S. Leverage and the Tom Barrack Doctrine

The United States remains the key external actor capable of shaping outcomes. Tom Barrack, Trump’s special envoy to Syria and a close confidant, has advocated for a negotiated solution that involves integrating the SDF into the Syrian army. This proposal is fundamentally unacceptable to the SDF, which sees disbanding its unified command as tantamount to surrender.

The United States maintains significant but not unlimited influence over the SDF’s strategic choices. American support has been crucial in maintaining SDF’s coalition cohesion, particularly in integrating Arab and Kurdish components into a unified force. Without this support, the alliance might fragment as Arab groups seek accommodation with Damascus or local tribal leaders.

However, American leverage faces important constraints. Strong Congressional backing for the SDF creates domestic political obstacles for any administration seeking to abandon Kurdish allies, while the Trump administration must balance support for the SDF against broader regional relationships, particularly with Turkey. The United States can pressure the SDF toward integration with Syrian government forces, but it cannot force acceptance of terms that threaten organizational survival without risking a complete breakdown of cooperation.

Conclusion: A Fragile Stalemate

The current standoff reflects fundamentally irreconcilable positions that resist easy resolution. Damascus demands individual integration of SDF fighters into government forces, effectively dissolving the organization, while the SDF insists on institutional recognition and territorial autonomy. Neither side appears willing to accept the other’s minimum requirements, creating a dangerous impasse.

Several scenarios remain possible as this crisis evolves. Extended negotiations might eventually produce a face-saving arrangement involving partial territorial concessions by the SDF in exchange for limited autonomy in core areas, though such compromise currently seems distant. Alternatively, the situation might stabilize into a de facto partition, with neither side strong enough to alter the status quo decisively.

More troubling possibilities include gradual erosion of SDF cohesion as Arab components defect over time, leaving Kurdish areas increasingly isolated, or escalation that forces more active American engagement to prevent broader conflict.

The current moment is defined by a fragile stalemate. Neither side has the will—or perhaps the ability—to decisively impose its terms. Yet both remain fundamentally irreconcilable in their core demands. Until this deadlock is broken, the future of Syria’s northeast will remain suspended between uneasy autonomy and the looming threat of war.