As Iraq nears its upcoming parliamentary elections and the Middle East continues to reel from escalating instability, the issue of Shiite armed groups and the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has reemerged as a focal point of contention—caught between external demands, internal rivalries, and the resistance of the groups themselves.

U.S. Pressure for Disarmament

According to well-informed Shiite sources, the United States—through Chargé d’Affaires Steven Fagin—has delivered stern warnings to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani about the urgent need to disarm Shiite militias and bring their weapons under state control. The American message is clear: “If Iraq fails to resolve this issue on its own, external pressure will intensify and decisive actions will be taken.”

Multiple Iraqi political sources, including the Parliament Speaker and several Prime Ministerial advisors, have confirmed these U.S. pressures regarding weapons operating outside government authority. The disarmament demands extend beyond the so-called “loyalist PMF” groups—those aligned with Iranian political and security directives—to include integrating the broader Popular Mobilization Forces with Iraq’s regular army and police forces.

While officially an Iraqi security institution under the Prime Minister’s General Command of Armed Forces, the PMF effectively serves as the military wing of Shiite political parties, notably the Badr Organization and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani revealed that Washington has directly communicated with Iraqi political leadership about the PMF issue. This pressure has effectively frozen parliamentary discussions on PMF-related legislation, preventing the matter from attracting further American scrutiny. Al-Mashhadani described the U.S. position as demanding full integration of PMF units into the regular army rather than mere organizational restructuring—a compromise Washington explicitly rejects.

Intelligence sources in both Tel Aviv and Baghdad confirm that Iraq’s Shiite armed groups remain under constant Israeli surveillance. During the recent 12-day conflict involving Iran, Israel delivered a blunt ultimatum to Baghdad: any group acting against Israeli interests would face immediate military retaliation, potentially drawing Iraq itself into the crossfire.

While al-Sudani’s government successfully restrained Shiite militias during the recent conflict—preventing Iraq from being drawn into a broader regional war—maintaining such control in future crises remains uncertain. The Israel-Iran confrontation has opened multiple scenarios for potential escalation. Complicating matters further, several Iraqi radar installations were struck during the conflict’s final hours in attacks that remain unclaimed, raising concerns about similar incidents recurring.

Recent financial pressure tactics have added another layer of coercion. Last month, PMF salary distributions were suspended for ten days after their bank cards were frozen—a move some interpret as the beginning of America’s practical campaign to dismantle or absorb these forces into regular security institutions. While PMF leaders initially claimed the delay was merely technical, Maysam al-Zaidi, commander of the Abbas Combat Division (26th PMF Brigade), disclosed that the U.S. Treasury Department had pressured the payment processor “Ki Card” to halt their financial services.

To circumvent these restrictions, PMF leadership turned to the Nahrain Islamic Bank and reverted to cash payments—a workaround that contradicts the government’s digitalization policies while potentially exposing them to further U.S. sanctions. Critics of Iraq’s current political system have threatened to report these alternative funding mechanisms to American decision-makers.

Within Shiite political circles, there’s widespread belief that American pressure on armed groups primarily serves to guarantee Israeli security and protect Washington’s regional allies. However, the challenge runs deeper than external pressure alone. Opposition to these militias exists within Iraq itself—among both Shiites and Sunnis who view them as threats to national stability. Beyond their domestic political interference and electoral manipulation, these groups risk drawing Iraq into unwanted international conflicts. The U.S. condemnation of attacks on Kurdistan Region energy infrastructure (July 15) exemplifies how uncontrolled weapons create diplomatic complications for Baghdad.

Iraq’s top Shiite religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has repeatedly emphasized over the past two years that all weapons must be consolidated under state control, most recently through his representative in Karbala in June 2025. Simultaneously, Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Shiite National Movement, has applied his own pressure for militia dissolution and PMF-army integration. Crucially, al-Sadr has made his electoral support for Shiite lists in the November 11, 2025 elections contingent upon progress on disarmament—a calculated move to pressure ruling Shiite political forces and establish preconditions for future cooperation.

Militia Defiance and Religious Justifications

Shiite armed groups categorically reject disarmament demands, with the most defiant response coming from Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades). This powerful faction, whose leader Abu Fadak serves as PMF Chief of Staff, straddles the line between the Iraqi state and Iran’s regional “resistance axis.” Through military spokesperson Abu Ali al-Askari, the group has declared it will not surrender weapons until the appearance of the Twelfth Imam (the Mahdi)—effectively making disarmament contingent on an eschatological event central to Shiite belief.

The group’s rhetoric has turned increasingly hostile toward disarmament advocates, using derogatory terms like “effeminate” and “cowards” to describe their critics. Many observers interpret these attacks as directed specifically at al-Sadr, who recently renewed his calls for militia dissolution.

At the operational level, PMF Deputy Chief of Staff Yasser Hussein al-Issawi has warned that his forces remain “prepared to confront any development”—language that could signal armed resistance to forced disarmament, particularly as Iran’s regional network faces pressure from Lebanon to Tehran, with Hezbollah in Beirut confronting its own disarmament demands.

Militia supporters justify their armed stance through both religious and strategic arguments. Beyond viewing their weapons as divinely mandated while awaiting the Mahdi’s return, they cite legitimate security concerns about regional instability. They point to the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) in Syria and what they perceive as coordinated American-Israeli efforts targeting Shiite communities across the region.

Domestically, these groups express fear of Sunni populations and Kurdistan Regional Government forces, particularly following sectarian rhetoric in recent electoral campaigns. The inflammatory speech by Khamis Khanjar, leader of the Sovereignty Alliance, exemplifies these tensions—he explicitly accused Shiite militias of “parasitically benefiting from public resources” while operating “outside state authority,” describing their continued existence as fundamentally dangerous. Such discourse threatens to intensify in coming days, creating additional pressure on Shiite unity, especially as Iraqi Sunnis increasingly view the new Sunni-led, anti-Shiite government in Syria as potential “strategic depth” for their community.

The Struggle for Legitimization

To prevent forced integration with regular security forces, some Shiite factions—particularly Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq—are pushing for parliamentary passage of comprehensive PMF legislation during the current session. The movement’s leader, Qais al-Khazali, frames this as the “historical, religious, and moral obligation” of the legislature. However, Parliament Speaker al-Mashhadani has firmly rejected such discussions, arguing that formal legislative action would only increase risks to the PMF by drawing unwanted attention.

Behind-the-scenes negotiations reveal a more complex picture. Sources close to the al-Sudani government indicate that most Shiite groups—excluding Kataib Hezbollah—have expressed willingness to integrate with Iraqi state security institutions, particularly within an expanded PMF framework. These negotiations involve approximately four to five major factions. The proposed arrangement would transform these groups into conventional political parties while their personnel assume official government positions.

However, these negotiations have stalled due to the charged electoral atmosphere and growing conviction within Shiite political circles that militia dissolution would inevitably lead to PMF dismantlement as well. Prime Minister al-Sudani continues to maintain that Iraq will not tolerate weapons outside state control, while simultaneously defending these groups as products of extraordinary circumstances rather than voluntary formations.

Given that al-Sudani’s government lacks autonomy on militia-related issues and other Iran-connected files, the likelihood of external punishment and intervention exceeds the government’s capacity to withstand pressures for group disarmament. This constraint has led multiple well-informed sources within Shiite circles to warn that Iraq is heading toward sanctions and potential military targeting—warnings that carry particular weight given their proximity to decision-making centers.

The disarmament crisis represents a fundamental challenge to Iraq’s sovereignty, caught between external demands for militia dissolution and internal forces determined to maintain their armed capabilities. As regional tensions escalate and domestic political competition intensifies ahead of elections, this standoff threatens to define Iraq’s political trajectory and its relationship with both regional powers and the international community.