US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack has intensified his rhetoric against the SDF following the collapse of the March agreement between the SDF and Damascus, as a planned trilateral meeting between Barrack, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi fell through.

Context: On July 9, a scheduled meeting in Damascus between Mazloum Abdi, President Ahmad al-Sharaa, and Tom Barrack was abruptly cancelled. Instead, Barrack met with al-Sharaa alone. In the days that followed, Barrack launched a series of pointed interviews with Kurdish and Turkish media, openly rejecting the SDF’s aspirations to remain a unified armed actor or to secure federal status within Syria.

Analysis: Prior to June 9th, Barrack had maintained a diplomatic and deliberately vague approach when discussing the SDF’s future and its integration with the Syrian army. However, following the June 9th meeting—where the planned trilateral discussion aimed at advancing the March agreement between Abdi and al-Sharaa failed to materialize—Barrack’s statements regarding the SDF have become markedly more direct and critical.

In a press briefing on June 11th, he bluntly declared that the March agreement “didn’t work,” adding that “everybody rushed to an agreement with no specifications. The specifications matter. So now we’re at the point of really putting together the specifications.” Since June 9th, he has grown increasingly critical of the SDF while simultaneously praising al-Sharaa. He has categorically stated that “federalism doesn’t work in Syria,” insisted that the SDF must move “fast” to integrate into the Syrian government, and controversially linked the YPG as “an offshoot of PKK” and the SDF as “a derivative of YPG,” effectively tying the SDF to the PKK on record, publicly echoing Ankara’s long-held position.

While it’s understandable that the SDF would be reluctant to voluntarily relinquish all its power in exchange for symbolic gestures, US policy has become increasingly clear since Trump assumed office in January. This approach markedly differs from Israel’s strategy, which has advocated for a de facto partitioned Syria to maintain state weakness and ensure Syria poses no permanent challenge to Israeli interests.

Some argue that Barrack’s statements reflect his personal views rather than official US policy toward Syria, but this argument becomes untenable when examining the broader patterns within the Trump administration. First, Trump himself dramatically lifted sanctions on Syria in a major policy shift that surprised even the most ardent al-Sharaa supporters, signaling a clear US pivot toward supporting the new government. Second, Trump has been remarkably open about his cooperation with Turkey, envisioning collaboration across multiple arenas. Similarly, US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff described the Trump-Erdogan phone call in March as “really transformational,” highlighting how the two leaders are coordinating on issues spanning Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine.

Finally, Trump’s appointment of Barrack—described as one of his closest confidants and personal friends—as both ambassador to Turkey and Syria envoy clearly demonstrates the priority he places on working with Turkey and his view of the Syria portfolio as an extension of Turkish relations. This is why a US-Turkey Syria working group was established immediately upon Barrack’s appointment as Syria envoy.

The signs of this new US policy toward Syria—and by extension the SDF—have become increasingly apparent. What has further tilted the balance in al-Sharaa’s favor versus the SDF is his backing from Saudi Arabia, which proves crucial given the Trump administration’s regional vision. Since Trump and his two regional envoys, Barrack and Witkoff, are all businessmen with strong historical ties to the Gulf, they prioritize stability and believe the most effective path involves strengthening central governments in the region—provided they align with US interests. The post-October 7th changes that led to the collapse of the Iranian axis have made this approach more viable than before.

The advantages of working with al-Sharaa, from the US prespective, may now outweigh the benefits of partnering with the SDF because al-Sharaa aligns with key US objectives: driving Iran out of Syria, weakening Russia’s footprint, dismantling Captagon networks that have wreaked havoc across the region (particularly in Saudi Arabia), neutralizing Syria’s threat to Israel, and positioning Syria as the center of an emerging regional alliance between Saudi Arabia and Turkey to fill the void created by collapsed Iranian regional influence.

Whether this strategy proves viable for Syria remains to be seen, but it’s clear that the US as a whole—not just Barrack—has decided to reshape regional states from within. As Barrack stated, the US “honors nation-states that are acknowledged, viable, and legal – full stop.” This doesn’t mean the SDF will accept this approach, but as Barrack indicated, the SDF is free to choose a different course, though the US will then have “another alternative.”

The Trump administration has been attempting a softer approach not out of concern for the SDF—as evidenced by Trump’s apparent indifference to the SDF in 2019—but due to potential congressional backlash if the SDF issue escalates into another conflict, as nearly occurred when Trump attempted withdrawal in 2019 and was forced to reverse course due to intense media and congressional opposition.

At its core, the US pivot on Syria is no longer about the SDF—it’s about a broader regional strategy. The SDF is becoming a secondary consideration in a larger game of statecraft in which Washington sees more value in reconstructing cooperative states than maintaining fragmented autonomy zones that no longer fit its evolving map for the Middle East.