Last night at roughly the same time, at least three coordinated attacks occurred at different locations: a drone struck a Yazidi IDP camp near Zakho in Duhok province, three missiles were fired in Kirkuk with one landing near the runway of Kirkuk Airport, and 12 drones targeted the Baiji refinery in Salahuddin province.

Context: The three attacks took place within the same hour at midnight, though it remains unclear who orchestrated them. While none of the attacks caused casualties, the kamikaze drone that hit a school in the Darkar IDP camp—which has housed Yazidis from Sinjar since 2014—caused material damage. The Kirkuk attack involved three Katyusha missiles: one failed near the airport runway causing light material damage, while another struck a civilian house causing substantial damage. The swarm drone attack on the Baiji oil refinery reportedly involved 12 drones, though Iraqi security forces claim to have intercepted them all without significant damage.

Analysis: While there is little apparent connection between the strategic value of these three targets and no clear identification of the perpetrator, they fit into a broader pattern of recent attacks. Just as the Israel-Iran conflict was concluding after a ceasefire was brokered on June 24th, a series of kamikaze drones attacked three Iraqi military bases: Taji in Salahuddin, Balad base also in Salahuddin, and Imam Ali Base in Dhi Qar Governorate. The most significant target was a French-made radar system struck at Taji. At the time, pro-Iran groups in Iraq were widely suspected, as simultaneous attacks targeted the US base at Baghdad Airport and Ain Al-Assad in Anbar, though those drones were intercepted. Pro-Iran social media accounts celebrated the attacks, claiming the radars were being used by the US to serve Israel, but the militias officially denied involvement and accused Israel of the strikes.

These latest attacks could be part of this emerging pattern of drone attacks from within Iraq. There are conflicting theories about the culprit: pro-Iran supporters claim this resembles tactics used by Israeli agents who manufactured and deployed drones from inside Iran during the recent 12-day conflict, suggesting similar methods are being used to degrade Iraq’s capabilities without direct confrontation or responsibility. However, several factors suggest this may not be Israeli involvement:

First, this pattern fits with the June 24th attacks, which evidence increasingly points to pro-Iran groups. Second, the nature of the targets makes Israeli involvement less likely. Third, Baiji has been repeatedly targeted, and this attack appears to have been the primary objective given the deployment of 12 drones in a coordinated swarm.

The Baiji refinery, Iraq’s largest, has faced at least three attempted attacks since reopening last year. On May 18th, it suffered substantial damage to a unit that had just become operational. While initial official reports attributed this to “technical” causes, a subsequent parliamentary investigation concluded it was a deliberate and precise drone strike targeting a specific reactor less than 24 hours after it resumed production for the first time since 1991. A second drone attack was attempted two days later but was unsuccessful as air defenses intercepted the drone. This marks the third attempted attack on Baiji within two months.

Thus, last night’s attempted drone strike marks the third attack on Baiji in under two months. The facility, Iraq’s largest refinery, was rebuilt nearly a decade after it was seized by ISIS. During the chaos, much of the refinery’s equipment was looted and later recovered in Erbil, where it had been stored for years before being returned. Notably, reports at the time implicated Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a key pro-Iran militia, in cooperation with others, in attempts to smuggle stolen refinery equipment, but they were reportedly intercepted and caught in the act.

Some reports claim the repeated attacks on Baiji may stem from competition between rival militia groups over the refinery’s contracts and tenders, although this remains an unconfirmed speculation.

During the first attacks, other theories emerged, including possible involvement by Kurdish groups such as the PUK or KDP, especially after Bafel Talabani openly promised to retaliate with “twice the force” if the Khormor gas field—under PUK control in the Kurdistan Region and Iraq’s largest natural gas field—faced further attacks. However, the repeated nature and pattern of attacks on Baiji make militia rivalry over contracts a more plausible explanation.

This still leaves open the question of why Kirkuk and Zakho were also targeted. The rationale is murky. One possibility is diversion: the additional strikes may have been meant to scatter attention away from Baiji. Alternatively, these could have been secondary targets with their own strategic logic. Kirkuk Airport might be tied to U.S. logistics, particularly given the suspected continued U.S. presence at the nearby K1 base. However, Kirkuk’s governor suggested ISIS could be behind the attack, claiming the group has suffered heavy blows recently and may be retaliating. While this possibility can’t be entirely ruled out, the timing of the Kirkuk strike—occurring almost simultaneously with the Baiji and Zakho attacks—raises doubts. Coordinated attacks of this nature require significant logistical planning, which does not typically match ISIS’s current capabilities in northern Iraq. Still, the claim reflects lingering security concerns and the difficulty of attributing such incidents amid overlapping threats. The IDP camp in Zakho, home to displaced Yazidis, may have been targeted to pressure them to return to Sinjar—an area now under militia control. Pro-Iran groups may view the continued displacement of Yazidis in Zakho as a political liability, particularly during elections, since their location could influence their voting behavior.

Regardless of the specific motivations, last night’s attacks increasingly appear to fit an emerging trend of such coordinated strikes rather than representing an isolated incident.