None of the Iranian Kurdish factions commands large fighting forces, so their comparative strength is not measured in numbers alone. Rather, the defining metric is strategic depth – encompassing geographic entrenchment, operational infrastructure along Iran’s borders, and the resilience of networks within the Islamic Republic itself. This analysis assesses the Iranian Kurdish groups according to their potential influence at a critical moment when the Iranian regime faces unprecedented pressure, amid intensified Israeli attacks on Iranian territory.

PJAK: From Newcomer to Dominant Force

PJAK (the Free Life Party of Kurdistan) is the youngest among the Iranian Kurdish factions, but arguably the most potent. It was established as the Iranian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and from the outset benefited from the PKK’s established military infrastructure, command structure, and ideological network. PJAK encompasses a broader political and social structure that includes its civilian wing, KODAR (Free and Democratic Society of East Kurdistan), and its women’s organization, KJAR (East Kurdistan Free Women’s Society).

Despite its status as a latecomer, PJAK has emerged as the most active Kurdish militant group operating against the Iranian regime in the past two decades. Between 2014 and 2025, PJAK was responsible for about 70% of all attacks by Kurdish groups on Iranian forces, and approximately 80% of IRGC fatalities in these incidents, despite maintaining a formal ceasefire with Tehran. While PJAK’s overall number of attacks and resulting IRGC casualties may appear limited, the fact that it achieved such figures under a ceasefire only puts into perspective how marginal the other groups have become in operational terms.

A significant factor contributing to PJAK’s strategic edge is its entrenched presence in mountainous regions of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq bordering Iran. Confirmed PJAK positions span from the PKK stronghold of Qandil in the north down to the Asos mountains and further south in the Penjwen-Hawraman areas, providing unique proximity to Iranian territory. With an estimated fighting force of around 3,000, PJAK is not only larger than other Iranian Kurdish groups but can readily draw on a broader pool of PKK fighters, many of whom possess significant combat experience from conflicts in Turkey and Syria. The PKK’s flexibility in reallocating experienced personnel, particularly with the ongoing peace process in Turkey, significantly boosts PJAK’s combat readiness.

PJAK also benefits from a unique sociopolitical positioning. The Iranian Kurdish population is fragmented along both sectarian and linguistic lines—divided between Sunnis (around 60%), Shiites (30–35%), and religious minorities such as the Yarsanis, and between Kurmanji, Sorani, Gorani, and Fayli speakers. While this fragmentation has historically limited the ability of Kurdish parties to build unified movements, the PKK’s ideological framework—which integrates Alevis, Yazidis, Sunnis, and secularists—gives PJAK a structural advantage in penetrating these fault lines.

For example, PJAK is already believed to have deepened its roots among Kurmanji-speaking Kurds in towns like Urmia, Khoy, and Maku near the Turkish border. At the same time, it has made notable inroads among the intellectual and leftist-leaning Sorani-speaking population in cities like Sanandaj. Prominent diaspora intellectuals such as Abbas Vali are ideologically aligned with the PKK, further broadening PJAK’s reach into elite discourse.

While all Kurdish groups have struggled to gain traction in Shiite Kurdish areas—such as Kermanshah and Ilam, which are better integrated into the Shia-led political system in Tehran—PJAK is arguably best positioned to expand in this direction. First, the PKK has a proven record of appealing to minority Kurdish groups, including the Yazidis. Second, there is a latent ideological overlap: Shiite Kurds, particularly in places like Khanaqin in Iraq, have historically leaned toward communist and leftist ideologies, traditions which mirror the PKK’s secular revolutionary ethos more closely than that of nationalist-Islamist or tribal Kurdish factions.

That said, PJAK’s expansion is not uniform. In traditional KDPI strongholds such as Mahabad and surrounding districts, its influence remains more limited. Similarly, in parts of Urmia, some tribal populations retain historical allegiances to the Barzani family and KDP-linked networks.

Nonetheless, taken as a whole, PJAK’s unique combination of border entrenchment, operational continuity, cross-sectarian appeal, and ideological agility make it the most potent Iranian Kurdish group today, both militarily and politically.

KDPI: A Storied Legacy with Waning Influence

The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) is the oldest and historically most prominent Kurdish party in Iran. Its deep legacy, including the founding of the Mahabad Republic in 1946, gives it enduring symbolic capital and a residual support base—especially among families with generational loyalty to the movement and among sections of the Iranian Kurdish diaspora in Europe.

However, its military capacity has been significantly diminished. The KDPI currently maintains a nominal force of around 2000 fighters, but most are no longer battle-ready. Following major losses in the 1980s and 1990s, the group declared a halt to armed operations in 1996. While it symbolically revived its insurgency in 2016 under the “Rasan” campaign, this has yielded only a handful of skirmishes, with little strategic impact. Despite PJAK operating under a formal ceasefire during the same period, KDPI accounted for just around 20% of recorded Kurdish attacks against Iran from 2014 to 2025, and only 14% of IRGC casualties.

Compounding its military decline, KDPI has lost all physical outposts along the border. Its small presence in Sidakan and Choman (Erbil province) was dismantled following the 2023 Iraq–Iran security agreement, and its long-time headquarters in Koya was demilitarized and repurposed into a civilian camp under the supervision of the KRG’s security forces. While the party maintains cordial relations with both the KDP and PUK, it has largely remained politically independent. However, internal divisions—compounded by generational drift and the diaspora’s civilian lifestyle—have weakened its coherence and operational culture.

The Iranian state’s targeted decapitation of KDPI’s leadership was also a decisive blow. The assassinations of Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou in 1989 and Sadegh Sharafkandi in 1992 deprived the party of charismatic leadership. In the years since, the party has struggled to produce new figures capable of uniting its ranks or galvanizing a new generation of activists.

Although the KDPI still has some political relevance, especially in Mahabad and parts of Urmia where it retains historical roots, its influence has been increasingly eroded by the growing reach of PKK-aligned groups. While KDPI’s past leader Ghassemlou hailed from Urmia and the party once had a solid base there, it has steadily lost ground due to organizational stagnation and the assimilation of younger generations raised in the Kurdistan Region or in Europe.

Critically, the KDPI has made no meaningful inroads in Shiite Kurdish provinces like Kermanshah or Ilam. Its support remains concentrated among Sunni Kurds in Sorani-speaking areas. While its legacy ensures that it remains second only to PJAK in potential, the KDPI today functions more as a historical institution than a dynamic political-military actor.

Society of Call and Reform: Quiet Expansion Under Legal Cover

The Jamaat-e Da’wat va Islah (Society of Call and Reform) occupies a different niche altogether. Founded in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 revolution by Kurdish Sunni clerics such as Sheikh Nasir Subhani, it operates as a nonviolent Islamist movement. Though unofficial, it is widely understood to be the Iranian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is one of the largest legal Sunni organizations in Iran today—and significantly, nearly half of its members are ethnic Kurds.

Unlike the secular Kurdish parties, it operates openly within the Islamic Republic, organizing regular congresses, maintaining an elected central council, and expanding its social and educational activities. This legal status has allowed it to grow steadily over the past decade, particularly in Sunni Kurdish cities such as Sanandaj, Mahabad, Marivan, and Javanrud.

However, the Society’s influence is strictly non-military and geographically limited. It has no armed wing, avoids direct confrontation with the regime, and has no meaningful presence in Shia-majority areas like Kermanshah or Ilam. Nonetheless, its size, grassroots reach, and sustained expansion make it one of the most significant nonviolent Kurdish movements within Iran today.

Other Actors: Komala and PAK

Other Kurdish groups, notably Komala and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), now occupy largely peripheral roles. Komala, historically influential as a leftist and later socialist faction around Sanandaj, has splintered into multiple factions, losing its ideological clarity and operational cohesion. Most of its fighters have disarmed and relocated to civilian camps within the Kurdistan Region. The PAK, closely aligned and funded by the KDP in Iraq, lacks significant networks or influence inside Iran. With an estimated 500-800 fighters, it has conducted only two minor attacks on Iranian targets in the past decade, resulting in minimal IRGC casualties. To compensate for its lack of internal networks and influence, PAK has adopted a high-risk, high-visibility strategy, most notably by openly appealing for support from Israel.

In conclusion, among the Iranian Kurdish groups, PJAK clearly emerges as the most strategically potent faction. Its combination of cross-border entrenchment, operational capability, experienced cadres, and ideological flexibility positions it uniquely to capitalize on Tehran’s current vulnerabilities. The KDPI retains historical significance and potential political capital but lacks effective military capacity. The Society of Call and Reform maintains significant socio-political influence but no kinetic potential. Meanwhile, Komala and PAK are strategically marginalized, playing minor roles in the broader Kurdish opposition landscape.