The deadline for the relocation of Iranian Kurdish armed opposition groups based near Sulaimani is set to expire on May 10. Under the terms of a UN-supervised process, these groups are expected to move to a designated civilian camp in another part of the province. However, a newly leaked directive from Iraq’s National Security Advisor reveals that the restrictions imposed on these factions go far beyond what was initially disclosed.

Context: The relocation stems from a security agreement signed in September 2023 between Iran and Iraq, with the involvement of the KRG Interior Minister. The agreement stipulates that Iranian Kurdish opposition groups must be disarmed and transferred to civilian camps under UN oversight. The UN has played an active role in the implementation of the deal. The agreement primarily affects two categories of groups: factions of the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party, which are based in the Koya district, and three Komala factions stationed in separate camps around Sulaimani city.

The Komala factions are slated to be relocated to a new camp in Surdash, in northwest Sulaimani. While some members have already made the move, all senior figures are expected to complete their relocation by May 10. Yet concerns remain about the adequacy of the new site. A Komala official stated, “We are committed to the permit designated for us to relocate,” but added that the Surdash camp “is not suitable for all headquarters and families, has many shortcomings, and is not complete.”

Compounding the concerns is a leaked document dated April 24, signed by Iraq’s National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji. The directive stipulates a sweeping set of restrictions, banning “all political, military, economic, and social activities” by the groups. This marks a significant escalation from the original understanding of the agreement, which was believed to focus solely on disarmament while still permitting political engagement.

Analysis: This development is notable because the agreement was originally reported to require only disarmament while permitting political activities. The current restrictions are now so comprehensive that they even prohibit social activities, however that may be defined.

In 2024, a senior Iranian Kurdish opposition leader had remarked that while they accepted disarmament in order to avoid creating problems for the KRG, they would not tolerate a ban on political activities. It remains unclear how they will respond to the newly imposed measures or whether the Iraqi state has the capacity to enforce such sweeping constraints.

It’s worth noting that Iranian Kurdish groups have been significantly weakened over time, with their activities inside Iran or along the border largely diminished, save for occasional incidents. These groups have adapted to civilian life, with their families deeply integrated into normal life in the Kurdistan Region. This stands in stark contrast to the PKK, which has maintained its guerrilla structure and continues to operate from the mountains with strict internal discipline.

Nonetheless, the Iranian Kurdish groups continue to represent a latent threat in the eyes of Tehran. Their symbolic and strategic value persists—particularly if they can be reactivated in a future conflict. That possibility is part of what drives Iran’s insistence on a more comprehensive containment strategy.

The geopolitical context has also changed dramatically since the agreement was signed in 2023. Although Iran has long pursued the disarmament of these groups, it only took decisive steps after the widespread protests of 2022, which began in Kurdish regions following the death of Jina Amini. Tehran claims that the groups played a key role in inflaming the unrest, which quickly spread across the country. At the time, Iran was seen as holding one half of the regional security balance, with Israel on the other. That balance has since collapsed, and Iran’s regional calculations have shifted accordingly.

Tehran believes that Israel may support these Kurdish factions and that they could be used against Iran in the event of a regional military confrontation. This fear is particularly acute given Iran’s perception that it is increasingly surrounded by hostile actors. Within this evolving context, Iraq—and by extension, the KRG—offers the path of least resistance. Iraq’s security coordination with Iran, combined with the relative absence of international legal scrutiny, makes it a convenient channel through which Tehran can exert pressure. Unlike Turkish military incursions, Iraq’s cooperation allows Iran to pursue its goals through formal agreements.

Yet Iran’s ability to fully enforce this arrangement remains limited. The US is unlikely to support or enforce a complete disarmament, especially if it would render the Kurdish groups permanently inactive. Washington may prefer to preserve their organizational structure for future contingencies, particularly in the event of open conflict with Iran. As such, the US might accept a symbolic disarmament while quietly ensuring the groups remain operationally viable.

These dynamics ensure that the Iranian Kurdish opposition will remain part of Iran’s strategic threat calculus for the foreseeable future. Tehran is therefore likely to continue pushing its Iraqi allies to impose stricter control. However, without a comprehensive disarmament protocol where weapons are monitored, cataloged, and transferred to specific authorities—similar to what Turkey now seeks to implement with the PKK—the agreement cannot be fully executed.

The challenges of implementation are already apparent. Although the groups were supposed to have completed disarmament by the end of 2024, one of them held a military parade as recently as February 2025. This not only undermines the credibility of the disarmament process but also signals the fragility of the entire agreement.