The third top-level meeting between KDP Deputy Masrour Barzani and PUK President Bafel Talabani yesterday, along with a subsequent, more detailed session between the two parties’ negotiating teams, yielded no progress.

Context: Parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region were held in October 2024, yet the formation of the next KRG cabinet remains deadlocked despite a broad agreement on the main principles of governance. As a result, the Kurdistan Region has been operating under a caretaker government without a functioning parliament since 2023 — a situation that continues to this day.

Analysis: The formation of the KRG cabinet remains distant and is unlikely to be completed before Iraq’s November elections, meaning it may well be delayed into next year — more than a year after the elections were actually held. This ongoing deadlock could also affect negotiations over a potential KDP-PUK joint list for the Iraqi elections, particularly in the disputed territories.

The PUK is now pushing to secure either the prime minister or president position, although this appears to be a negotiating tactic aimed at forcing the KDP to concede other key posts — including a stronger speakership, if the PUK ultimately receives that role. The PUK argues that there is little value in obtaining the speakership if it remains weakened, with significant powers stripped away and transferred to a “parliament presidency” — a three-member body composed of the speaker, the deputy speaker, and the secretary, where decisions are made by majority vote.

In addition to the speakership, the PUK is also seeking the head of the Judicial Council, aiming to secure two out of the four top presidencies. Currently, three of these four presidencies are controlled by the KDP, while the fourth — the speakership — has been largely inactive, and even when functioning, was effectively paralyzed by the three-member council arrangement described above.

The KDP refuses to concede any of the four key positions — prime minister, president, security council advisor, and interior minister — which the PUK increasingly views as the main centers of power. In terms of strategic ministries, the KDP has only proposed offering the Peshmerga Ministry to the PUK — a portfolio the PUK already controls. However, the PUK is demanding control over the Oil and Interior Ministries or, if the KDP retains the Interior Ministry, insists on receiving the Security Council advisor post. The KDP has rejected these demands, so far only expressing preliminary agreement to grant the PUK the Finance and Peshmerga ministries.

Overall, there are three sectors where the KDP is unwilling to make any concessions to the PUK: the oil sector — with the PUK seeking control of the Natural Resources Ministry; the foreign relations sector, represented by the Department of Foreign Relations; and the security sector, represented by both the Interior Ministry and the Kurdistan Region Security Council Advisor post. The KDP’s position is that any negotiations should take place outside of these sectors, as well as the two top posts of prime minister and president of the region.

Additionally, the PUK is demanding that the powers of Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani be formally guaranteed in a written agreement — a request the KDP has also rejected. So far, the two sides have failed to agree on a single key position or even a general framework for distributing posts.

During the meeting, the PUK proposed the following classification of positions:

• First: The presidencies of the government, region, parliament, and judicial council should be treated as a single package and distributed with balance.
• Second: The Security Council advisor and the ministries of Interior, Peshmerga, Planning, Finance, and Natural Resources should be classified as sovereign ministries. If the KDP retains the Security Council advisor post, the Interior Ministry should be allocated to the PUK.
• Third: The 13 service ministries should be bundled into one package, with at least five ministries assigned to the PUK.
• Fourth: All other boards and departments of the Kurdistan Regional Government should be bundled into one package, with approximately half allocated to the PUK and half to the KDP.

The PUK argues that the KDP has historically exploited these positions, noting that in previous cabinets, such roles were not included in the formal negotiations, allowing the KDP to unilaterally fill them.

The KDP has rejected all of the PUK’s demands, arguing that the PUK’s expectations exceed its political weight and insisting that posts should be distributed proportionally to the number of parliamentary seats each party holds.