During the Trump–Netanyahu press conference yesterday, President Trump made it clear he intends to accommodate Erdogan’s demands. He even claimed that Turkey had effectively “taken over Syria,” something he said no one had achieved in the last 2,000 years. Whether or not that’s historically accurate is beside the point—the significance lies in how Trump seems to admire what he calls Erdogan’s “surrogates” capturing Syria. He spoke approvingly, implying that he accepts and perhaps even welcomes this outcome.

Trump also suggested that his rapport with Erdogan could allow him to broker some form of understanding between Turkey and Israel in Syria. However, he emphasized that Israel’s demands would need to be “reasonable.” This is revealing—not just diplomatically, but in terms of how Trump perceives the evolving dynamics in Syria. His framing shows that his policy decisions for both Syria and the broader region are likely shaped by this lens.

Reports also indicate that Israeli-Turkish negotiations—presumably mediated by the US—are underway to establish a “deconfliction line” arrangement in Syria. This would effectively divide spheres of influence, with each country controlling portions of Syrian airspace.

This is part of a broader geopolitical reshuffle in which Turkey has emerged as a central player across multiple arenas: from the Ukraine war to the Gaza conflict to the regional rivalry with Iran. And the Syrian Kurds, especially the SDF, are one of the key nodes in this shifting regional web.

Since Assad’s fall in December, Turkey’s approach toward the SDF has been contrary to expectations. Theoretically, Assad’s fall should have reinvigorated Turkey’s maximalist push to dismantle the SDF. Instead, Turkey has demonstrated flexibility, integrating the SDF issue into broader regional considerations for a specific reason: it’s part of a larger regional restructuring. Previously, Turkey’s ambitions were more modest—focused primarily on countering Kurdish influence. Now, Turkey has become more ambitious, seeking to fundamentally recalibrate the Kurdish element within its regional geopolitics.

Previously, Turkey’s ambitions were relatively modest—centered around neutralizing the Kurdish threat. But today, Ankara is pursuing a more expansive regional role. The idea that Turkey could militarily “solve” the Kurdish question was always shortsighted. That policy, long embedded in the Turkish state, constrained its strategic potential. Now, however, Turkey finds itself in a vastly different environment—its neighborhood, from Europe to the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, has opened unprecedented space for Turkish influence.

It’s undeniable that many observers remain skeptical of Turkey due to its political history. But this shouldn’t obstruct a sober analysis of current realities. Turkey is emerging as one of the victors of the new Middle Eastern order and is also positioning itself as a key player in the Ukraine–Russia conflict and Black Sea security architecture.

This is broadly how Ankara—and likely Trump as well—views Turkey’s role. Trump’s comments during the press conference with Netanyahu reinforce this interpretation. And this outlook directly informs Turkey’s strategy on the SDF.

Turkey views the SDF question through three lenses:

The PKK Nexus: First, as part of the broader PKK issue. This is gradually being addressed as Turkey attempts to politically integrate the PKK through negotiations with Ocalan, including constitutional reforms. The success of this process remains questionable, given that a key component was supposed to be democratization, yet Turkey has become more repressive since these negotiations began—exemplified by the arrest of Istanbul’s popular opposition mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu. This dilemma warrants separate analysis but represents a crucial element in relation to the SDF. For Turkey, resolving the PKK issue would transform the SDF into a subsidiary Syrian matter rather than one connected to Turkish domestic politics. Alternatively, some envision a grand bargain where Turkey accepts some form of SDF survival in exchange for the PKK’s dissolution.

A Syrian-Level Calculation:  Turkey’s current leniency toward the SDF is also a tactical choice. The new, Ankara-aligned government in Damascus is weak and grappling with serious internal challenges. Aggressively targeting the SDF—which controls roughly one-third of Syria—could destabilize the entire country. That’s a risk Turkey cannot afford. By easing pressure on the SDF, Ankara is enabling the new Syrian government to consolidate power, while at the same time entrenching its own military and political influence across Syria. This reflects a shift in Turkish strategy: from tactical confrontation to long-term presence.

The U.S.–Israel–Turkey Triangle: Turkey now views the SDF as part of a broader strategic negotiation with both the U.S. and Israel. Ankara is approaching the SDF issue with a more pragmatic and less paranoid lens, aiming to use its newfound flexibility to encourage a U.S. troop withdrawal from northeastern Syria—an outcome Trump already supports. At the same time, Israel appears to have leveraged its relationship with the Syrian Kurds to carve out a sphere of influence in southern Syria, particularly in Druze-majority areas like al-Suwayda. This aligns with both geographic logic and Israel’s longstanding ties to its own Druze population, many of whom serve in the Israeli military. Rather than confront Israel directly, Turkey may seek a broader bargain: accepting a de facto Israeli zone of influence south of Damascus in return for securing Turkish military positions elsewhere in Syria—and possibly facilitating a phased U.S. withdrawal, which will ultimately hinge on how the Iran file is handled.

To fully grasp the scale of this geopolitical choreography, one must view it as part of an emerging regional grand bargain—one that may also involve the future of Gaza, Turkey’s growing role as the political patron of Hamas, and the question of escalation against Iran. The scale of this shift was perhaps most clearly captured by Trump’s Middle East envoy, who described the Trump–Erdogan call not just as “good,” but as “transformational” for the entire region.

The underlying logic is straightforward: Turkey adopted more maximalist demands regarding the SDF when it was in a weaker position—economically vulnerable and geopolitically disadvantaged against both Europe and an ascendant Iranian axis in the Middle East. These maximalist demands reflected weakness and limited options. Now, with an Erdogan-friendly Trump administration, a weaker Europe (due to Trump’s anti-EU policies), a Turkish defense establishment more prepared than much of Europe’s, Erdogan’s strategic balancing in the Ukraine conflict (positioning Turkey as an important player), and a friendly government in Damascus, Turkey is in a much stronger position than a decade ago. The flexibility it now shows regarding the Kurdish question and the SDF indicates confidence and control, enabling it to pursue a longer-term strategy rather than abandoning its original objectives.