New data on poverty in the Kurdistan Region and Iraq and the trend over the last decade helps us examine a puzzling migration trend: according to a Home Office report, approximately 80% of Iraqis seeking asylum in the UK are Kurds, despite the KRG consistently performing better in some key economic metrics.

As shown in the poverty rate trend chart spanning 2007-2024, the Kurdistan Region has maintained significantly lower poverty levels than the Iraqi national average throughout this period. In 2007, Kurdistan’s poverty rate was just 5.03% compared to Iraq’s national average of 22.9%. However, the chart reveals two diverging trajectories: while Iraq’s national poverty rate has decreased from 22.9% to 17.5%, Kurdistan’s poverty rate has nearly doubled from 5.03% to 9.81% during the same timeframe.

Previous analysis from migration organization Lootka indicated that approximately 70-80% of migrants from Iraq to Europe via irregular routes are Kurds. This finding aligns with UK Home Office data cited by The Telegraph, which stated that 80% of Iraqi asylum seekers whose applications were rejected in 2023 were Kurdish.

Gallup survey data comparing perceptions of living standards between 2008 and 2022 provides additional context. In 2008, Kurdistan showed a higher satisfaction rate (53%) compared to the rest of Iraq (48%), coinciding with reduced Kurdish migration to Europe and even a reverse migration trend with Kurds returning to the Kurdistan Region. By 2022, however, satisfaction with living standards in the rest of Iraq increased dramatically to 72%, while satisfaction in Kurdistan decreased to 45%.

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Human perception of wellbeing is inherently subjective and relative to previous experiences. People are more sensitive to negative changes in their circumstances than to their position relative to others. Therefore, even though Kurds may still enjoy objectively better conditions than most other Iraqis, they are experiencing a downward trajectory. This declining trend, rather than the absolute comparison with other regions, can inform how people feel about their prospects and drives migration decisions.

The psychology of relative deprivation suggests that people evaluate their situation not only against others but against their own past. For Kurds, this perception of decline compared to their previous standard of living creates a stronger migration impetus than for other Iraqis who, despite higher absolute poverty rates, see their conditions improving. While KRG maintains lower overall poverty levels, the rapidly narrowing gap—as Kurdish poverty increases and Iraqi poverty decreases—intensifies this psychological impact of relative decline.

This analysis suggests that migration patterns cannot be understood through economic indicators alone. The subjective perception of deteriorating conditions, even from a historically stronger position, can be a more powerful driver of migration than absolute poverty levels. Migration policies that fail to account for these perceptual and psychological factors may miss crucial elements driving population movements.

The divergent trajectories between Kurdish and other Iraqi regions—one declining and one improving—create different psychological contexts for migration decisions despite their relative starting positions. This highlights the importance of trend analysis over static economic comparisons when forecasting and responding to migration patterns.