A few days ago, remnants of the Assad regime ambushed and killed several police officers in Syria’s coastal region, a stronghold of the Alawite community. In response, armed factions affiliated with Syria’s new government swiftly descended on the area. Beyond engaging the remnants, these groups revealed their brutality by massacring innocent civilians—women, children, and the elderly included. Videos of these atrocities, recorded and shared online, leave no doubt about the war crimes committed.

The clashes and the subsquent atrocities offer several critical insights:

1. The Assad remnants have strategically won for now: In modern asymmetric warfare, particularly in Syria’s deeply factionalized context (which we have analyzed in a previous essay as prone to infighting), tactical success is determined not merely by reclaiming territory from former Assad regime officers—made primarily from Maher Assad’s predominantly Alawite 4th Division—but by the strategic execution of such operations.

The pro-Assad elements appear to have orchestrated these attacks with high coordination and strategic foresight, strongly suggesting Iranian involvement, given Iran’s expertise in such asymmetric warfare. Their ambushes, which killed around a dozen police officers affiliated with Syria’s new government, provoked widespread fury among factions awaiting an opportunity to “punish” the Alawites, whom they view as embodiments of an Assad regime responsible for tens of thousands of Sunni deaths.

What followed was chilling: preliminary footage shows the deliberate slaughter of at least 500 civilians, including women and children, in cold blood—acts widely circulated on social media. This overreaction seems premeditated by the remnants, exposing the new rulers’ façade of restraint and validating the pro-Assad remnant’s narrative that the new rulers’ conciliatory rhetoric merely conceals their true violent nature, revealed by the slightest provocation. So in a way, it seems to have been a strategic trap, predicting the brutal brutality from these factions.

Although the extent of the crimes remains unclear, some pro-Syrian government analysts and activists claim that Assad remnants were primarily responsible. However, this does not make a significant difference at the strategic level or in the perception among Alawites. What is clear is that many of the killings appear to have been carried out by Syrian government-affiliated factions. Nevertheless, this does not change the overall argument or its strategic implications.

The information warfare component appears very well coordinated; concurrent with the initial pro-Assad attacks, well-established pro-Assad and pro-Iranian social media accounts activated en masse, disseminating news—much of it exaggerated—about the gains of pro-Assad forces, suggesting this was an integral element of their strategy.

The images of slain civilians have since gone viral across English-language media—notably amplified by pro-SDF officials, and pro-Israeli activists, but more significantly by media personalities close to Trump, whom he listens to, such as Tucker Carlson, Jack Posobiec or Roger Stone. This represents a devastating blow to the new HTS-led government’s quest for legitimacy and sanctions relief. Such diplomatic breakthroughs now appear considerably less attainable.

From a holistic perspective, this constitutes a major victory for the pro-Assad attackers, regardless of territorial outcomes. They have inflicted substantial damage on the reputation al-Shara’a has been cultivating over the past three months, likely delaying any potential sanctions relief. This, in turn, will further exacerbate Syria’s instability.

2. Turkey’s support presents a double-edged sword for the new HTS rulers: the new government’s reliance on Turkey is both a lifeline and a liability. Regional powers, wary of Ankara’s expanding influence, are exploiting this dynamic to destabilize Syria. Most documented violations against Alawites were perpetrated by factions within the National Syrian Army (NSA)—the pro-Turkish militia coalition ostensibly integrated into the newly formed Syrian army while still retaining its original structure.

While HTS maintains strict discipline, many NSA militias operate more as bandits—behavior extensively documented in the town of Afrin after Turkey captured it from the SDF. For years, Turkey has disregarded these groups’ extensive human rights violations in territories under its control and is now reaping the consequences. However, this now undermines the very government Turkey strives to support and legitimize.

Although HTS authorities have announced intentions to arrest those responsible for these atrocities, their capacity is limited, as excessive enforcement could trigger internal conflict with factions refusing to surrender their members. Conversely, such incidents will likely recur if these undisciplined militias remain unchecked.

Al-Shara’a now depends on Turkey more than ever to reform its military and restrain undisciplined factions connected to Turkey. However, excessive proximity to Turkey risks providing regional powers with pretexts for intervention to prevent Turkish expansion. This paradox suggests that declaring a winner in Assad’s fall remains premature.

3. Unexpected Convergence of Israeli and Iranian Interests: Strangely, Israel and Iran now converge on a vision of a fractured, decentralized Syria—both to thwart Turkey’s consolidation of power. Notably, regarding the coastal region events, only Israeli officials and staunchly pro-Iranian militia leaders, such as Abu Ala’a al-Walaei (commander of Iraq’s Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada), have condemned these actions as massacres against Alawites.

The notion that Iran has accepted defeat in Syria appears not merely premature but naive. Iran has invested significantly in Syria and established extensive networks beyond its direct relationship with Assad. Expecting Iran to abandon these assets and accept Turkish dominance reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Iranian strategic thinking and warfare doctrine.

Iranians approach conflict with strategic flexibility and excel in asymmetric warfare. Shortly before the recent clashes, Turkey’s Foreign Minister criticized Iran, eliciting a forceful Iranian response—suggesting Turkey possessed intelligence regarding Iranian movements in Syria but underestimated their potential impact.

Iran will likely persist in destabilization efforts, possessing multiple avenues for implementation: from networks established within Syria over years to land connections, from Lebanon via Hezbollah providing direct access to Syria’s coastal regions, to routes into Syria from Iraq.

4. Russia emerges as an unexpected beneficiary: Footage shows thousands of Alawites, likely including Assad regime remnants, seeking refuge at the Russian base in Latakia, concurrent with Russia’s negotiations with the HTS government to maintain its bases in Latakia and Tartus.

This development reinforces al-Shara’a’s imperative to cultivate relations with Russia and Gulf states to diversify its diplomatic portfolio and stabilize the country. According to Wall Street Journal reports, Israel actively wants Russia to maintain its presence specifically to check Turkey’s growing influence. This creates a complex reality where the new Syrian government needs at least Russia plus Gulf states in addition to Turkey to establish a viable path to governance, especially given that two regional powers—Israel and Iran—are already conspiring to fragment the country. Paradoxically, allowing Russians to stay may also benefit the new government by alleviating some of Israel’s concerns, potentially resulting in reduced pressure from Tel Aviv.

This represents another caution against hasty conclusions. When Assad fell, many characterized it as a devastating setback for Russia, but the reality is more nuanced. Russia now stands to benefit from this instability and holds a strengthened position in negotiations with the HTS government regarding its bases.

While Syria’s situation defies confident prediction, we maintain our analysis from a month ago: the country is likely to experience increased rather than decreased factionalization. What makes this particularly likely is the convergence of interests among otherwise adversarial groups. Despite their conflicting agendas elsewhere, multiple actors—from pro-Assad forces and Iran to Israel and various ethnic minorities—share a strategic interest in preventing a strong centralized Syrian government.