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Why Does Barzani Provide Sanctuary to Ba’athists in Erbil?

Recently, a series of controversies have emerged surrounding the presence of Ba’athist figures in Erbil and Masoud Barzani’s role in granting them sanctuary. Iraqi politician Ayad Allawi, one of Barzani’s closest allies, has even alleged that Barzani has permitted the establishment of a Ba’ath Party branch in Kurdistan. Further fueling the controversy, reports have surfaced that individuals linked to the former regime, including the person allegedly responsible for the killing of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr—the father of Muqtada al-Sadr—were residing in Erbil before being apprehended. Additionally, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law claimed in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that he was granted refuge in Erbil and that Barzani personally facilitated his acquisition of an Iraqi passport, allowing him to travel to Qatar to reunite with his family.
The presence of former Ba’athist figures in Erbil has become a contentious issue, particularly among opposition groups in the Kurdistan Region and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), who have weaponized the topic to undermine the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However, reducing this phenomenon to a simple moral argument overlooks the underlying strategic considerations.
The KDP has strategically leveraged these relationships both domestically and regionally to consolidate its position. While the Ba’athist regime’s collapse over two decades ago has diminished its influence, with most senior figures no longer active, the symbolic and practical value of these connections persists.
The KDP’s Strategic Framework
From a moral standpoint, the KDP’s willingness to engage with figures linked to the Anfal campaign—a genocide that targeted the Kurds—may seem contradictory. However, pragmatism has long defined the party’s political strategy. The fact that the KDP invited Saddam’s army into Erbil in 1996 to counterbalance its rivalry with the PUK underscores that such alliances are not new or surprising.
The KDP operates on a distinctly pragmatic doctrine: any tool that enhances its power and influence will be exploited. A fundamental characteristic of the party’s political methodology has been maintaining a calculated disparity between public positions and private initiatives. The party’s core strategic assessment holds that a strong, centralized Iraq represents an existential threat to its regional dominance. Through this lens, providing sanctuary to Ba’athist figures—who themselves represent a theoretical challenge to Baghdad’s authority—aligns precisely with the KDP’s broader objective of maintaining a weakened and fragmented Iraqi state.
The rhetoric surrounding the threat posed by Ba’athist remnants largely remains theatrical for several reasons: 1. The party’s structure has been largely dismantled. 2. A faction merged with ISIS and has subsequently been neutralized. 3. Others have been absorbed into the mainstream political process through various parties. 4. The remaining elements have been forced into exile, severely compromising their domestic networks.
However, when Allawi spoke of Ba’athists opening a branch in Erbil, he framed it within the broader narrative of the Ba’ath Party’s supposed resurgence—suggesting that Barzani is playing an active role in this process. According to Allawi, even the U.S. has hinted at reconsidering its stance on the Ba’ath Party’s political future in Iraq.
How Hosting Ba’athists Serves the KDP’s Interests
Barzani’s decision to provide sanctuary to Ba’athists is not a random act of hospitality but a calculated move that serves the KDP’s interests in several interconnected ways:
How Hosting Ba’athists Serves the KDP’s Interests
Leverage Against Baghdad
Hosting Ba’athist figures positions Erbil as an alternative power center in Iraq, reinforcing its status as a parallel capital. This strengthens Barzani’s geopolitical importance and provides additional bargaining power in negotiations with the federal government.
Strengthening Sunni-Barzani Ties
By engaging with Ba’athists and Sunni dissidents, Barzani extends influence among Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. This helps counterbalance the Shi’a majority and translates into greater leverage in Iraq’s parliament, enabling the KDP to protect Kurdish interests through strategic alliances.
Expanding Regional Influence
Engagement with Ba’athists and Sunni insurgents strengthens relationships with key regional players like Turkey, Gulf states, and Jordan. Their presence in Erbil serves as a diplomatic tool, facilitating alliances and keeping Barzani relevant in discussions about Iraq’s political future.
1. Leverage Against Baghdad: By positioning Erbil as a refuge for those persecuted or marginalized by Baghdad, Barzani elevates the city into an alternative power center within Iraq. This enhances Erbil’s geopolitical stature, casting it as a counterweight to the capital and amplifying Barzani’s influence. The presence of Ba’athists becomes a bargaining chip in the KDP’s ongoing tussle with Baghdad—a tool among many to assert autonomy and challenge central authority.
2. Strengthening Sunni-Barzani Ties: By engaging with Ba’athists and Sunni dissidents, Barzani extends his influence among Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. This aligns with the KDP’s strategic objective of counterbalancing the Shi’a majority, which has sought to limit Kurdish political ambitions. Closer ties with Sunni groups also translate into greater leverage in Iraq’s parliament, enabling the KDP to obstruct Shi’a-dominated legislation that could threaten his interests. This extends Barzani’s influence beyond mere parliamentary representation, making him a key player in national politics.
3. Expanding Regional Influence: Barzani’s engagement with Ba’athists and Sunni insurgents bolsters his relationships with key regional players, including Turkey, the Gulf states, and Jordan. These countries, often at odds with Baghdad, value Erbil’s role as a sanctuary for exiles with transnational ties. Furthermore, many of these figures maintain strong regional ties, meaning their presence in Erbil can serve as a diplomatic tool for fostering alliances. For instance, Saddam’s son-in-law now resides in Qatar, suggesting potential coordination between Barzani and Doha. Similarly, when former Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni leader, fled Baghdad to escape prosecution, Erbil provided him with refuge before he relocated to Turkey—strengthening Barzani’s ties with Ankara.
Moreover, intelligence-driven strategies for potential political shifts in Iraq often factor in exiled or marginalized figures. By hosting them, Barzani remains relevant in discussions about Iraq’s political future and any prospective power realignments.
While morally contentious, Barzani’s decision to offer sanctuary to Ba’athists is, from a realist perspective, a strategic asset that significantly enhances his political clout. The KDP’s strategy thrives on exploiting divisions—within Iraq and beyond—to secure its dominance. Far from a liability, the Ba’athist presence in Erbil is an asset, solidifies his influence within Iraq, fortifies Kurdish-Sunni partnerships, and elevates his regional standing.