“Time” has emerged as a critical element in the Syrian Kurdish SDF’s strategic calculations regarding its ongoing dispute with the new Damascus government. 

The Syrian Defence Minister recently told Reuters that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were “procrastinating in handling the complex issue” of northeast Syria, a region controlled by the SDF with U.S. backing. Meanwhile, Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, stated that while negotiations with the SDF were ongoing, he was not “optimistic” about achieving a breakthrough. Others speculate that much of the SDF’s future hinges on U.S.-Turkey negotiations.

The temporal dimension is indeed a crucial factor in this equation, yet these statements present divergent interpretations of what “time” or “procrastinating” signifies in the SDF’s strategic calculations. While U.S.-Turkey negotiations undoubtedly influence the SDF’s future and northeast Syria’s status, internal Syrian dynamics remain the overlooked factor in analyzing the SDF’s trajectory. Though the Damascus-based government attempts to frame the SDF region as the only territory beyond its control due to U.S. military presence, the reality is far more intricate – Syria remains deeply factionalized, with rival militias controlling various regions, each backed by foreign powers.

Thus far, only the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), a coalition of various militias including several Turkmen groups directly linked to Turkish National Intelligence (MIT), has nominally accepted integration into the new Syrian Army under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) control. However, this integration appears superficial, as HTS is unlikely to grant significant roles to the SNA, given HTS’s position as de facto rulers. The new Syrian Defense Minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, an HTS commander and al-Sharaa confidant, focuses on building a loyal army – a task requiring trusted personnel during this fragile transition period. Al-Sharaa has increasingly elevated foreign nationals to key positions, as they likely represent his most reliable partners given their limited options compared to Syrian opposition commanders: unable to return to their home countries yet barred from the presidency due to their foreign nationality, they are inherently motivated to maintain al-Sharaa’s power.

This dynamic is expected to fuel internal competition between the SNA and HTS within the new army structure. Moreover, Turkey maintains a vested interest in keeping the SNA’s integration nominal, preserving it as leverage against al-Sharaa, who may become more independent as he consolidates power.

Emerging Insurgencies and Factional Struggle

Simultaneously, a low-intensity but expanding insurgency has taken root in the coastal Alawite-majority provinces of Latakia and Tartus. This resistance likely stems from remnants of the Assad regime who retain their weapons and now find heightened motivation to resist an Islamist government. For this community, the preservation of their lifestyle supersedes political considerations. The Alawites, fundamentally a secular sect only nominally categorized as Shi’ites, share minimal theological commonality with the Twelver Shi’ites and represent a direct contrast to the lifestyle mandated by Iran’s Shi’ite theocracy. This insurgency will likely intensify as resentment builds against the new rulers who, emboldened by their recent ascension to power, may target former power brokers and regions historically associated with supporting the Assad regime. These armed groups’ persistent connections with Iran or Hezbollah further complicate this emerging challenge for the HTS leadership.

In the southern region of Daraa, the Southern Front or 8th Birgade, led by Ahmad al-Awda – a former Islamist turned pragmatist – continues to control most of the province.  This faction dominates Daraa province and refuses to disarm or integrate into the new Syrian Army. Notably, their commanders were conspicuously absent from the Damascus conference that installed al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim president, marking them as the only major Sunni Arab group to abstain. The Southern Front’s influence extends from areas south of Damascus to the Jordanian border, earning them local recognition as “Russia’s men” due to their previous arrangement with Moscow and the Assad regime – a deal that allowed them to maintain their organizational structure and territorial control while nominally integrating into the Syrian Army. Their activities reportedly include cross-border smuggling and extortion operations along the Jordanian frontier. The group maintains reported ties with the UAE and Jordan, seeking to preserve their operational autonomy similar to their arrangement under Assad post-“reconciliation.” Furthermore, pro-HTS media sources have alleged that the Southern Front, which entered Damascus just before HTS during Assad’s fall, received explicit Russian directives to destroy sensitive documents and facilitate the evacuation of key Assad regime figures.

In neighboring al-Suwayda, Syria’s sole Druze-majority province, the Druze militias have outright rejected HTS’s authority, refusing to allow its forces to enter the region. They’ve articulated clear conditions for recognizing the new government and integrating into the Syrian Army: the establishment of a civilian, secular constitution with explicit protections for minority rights. These Druze forces leverage their indirect connections with Israel, maintained through their Druze counterparts in the Golan Heights, as diplomatic capital in pressing their demands before any integration with Damascus. This dynamic is further complicated by Israel’s recent territorial advances, including their presence on Mount Hermon, which provides strategic oversight of Damascus from its elevated position.

Furthermore, the al-Tanf garrison, situated at the Syria-Iraq-Jordan triangle, presents another layer of complexity. While the US-backed Syrian Free Army factions controlling this area formally recognized al-Sharaa and participated in his installation conference in Damascus, their integration remains superficial – as the saying goes, “the devil is in the details.” These forces appear unlikely to submit to complete absorption by HTS so their long-term allegiance remains uncertain.

SDF’s Calculated Approach to Time

For the SDF, which stands as the largest among these forces and rivals HTS in organizational capability, time serves as a crucial lever in resisting HTS’s demands against de facto autonomy and the preservation of their military structure, knowing that the new Syrian government lacks the capacity to challenge them militarily in the near term. The SDF reportedly has around 100,000 fighters, many of whom are battle-hardened and deeply committed to their cause. Before HTS can even consider confronting the SDF militarily, it must first deal with the smaller but still significant factions across Syria. The HTS-led government lacks the military strength to tackle these multiple fronts simultaneously.

Compounding these challenges, Syria’s deteriorating economic situation looms as an imminent threat to al-Sharaa’s governance. His need for sanctions relief to boost the economy and alleviate mounting pressure constrains his military options against the Kurds, Druze, or Southern Front, effectively cementing the status quo. While the Turkish factor distinguishes the SDF question, the HTS-led government faces more complex challenges than commonly acknowledged.

The temporal dimension emerges as a critical strategic asset for the SDF: their apparent “procrastination” represents a calculated tactic, as maintaining the status quo and strategic patience currently presents their optimal strategy. This approach allows them to observe developments, particularly as HTS faces even more complex challenges in other regions. The Southern Front situation proves especially delicate, as they represent the only major Sunni faction outside Damascus’s control – any military confrontation risks igniting a Sunni civil war, a scenario HTS cannot risk before consolidating power, as it could lead to their complete loss of authority. Yet this power consolidation itself remains precarious due to ongoing tensions with the SNA.

Turkey’s strategic calculus proves equally complex: forcing HTS into a direct conflict with the SDF could undermine Ankara’s efforts to establish a pro-Turkish government in Damascus. At the same time, tolerating Kurdish autonomy is unacceptable to Turkey’s strategic interests. However, the prospect of destabilizing their newly established pro-Turkish government in Damascus presents significant risks that may outweigh potential benefits of pressuring the SDF militarily.

Given these complexities, the SDF’s so-called “procrastination” is, in reality, a strategic waiting game. The best course of action for the SDF is to maintain the status quo, watching as HTS struggles with its internal challenges. The risk of further fragmentation and chaos within the new government is increasing, rather than decreasing, as the newly empowered factions grapple with the realities of governance, power, and wealth.

Thus, in the evolving Syrian conflict, “time” is not a passive element but an active tool in the SDF’s strategy—one that could prove decisive as the broader landscape continues to shift.