More than six months have passed since the Kurdistan parliamentary elections, yet the formation of the next Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cabinet remains uncertain. Despite recent meetings between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—including high-level talks between PUK leader Bafel Talabani and KDP’s Deputy President Masrour Barzani—several key differences remain unresolved.

The KDP insists that the positions of Prime Minister and President are non-negotiable, having already designated Masrour Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani for those roles. This raises the question: how will the PUK be accommodated in other senior positions?

Timeline Expectations

Some political analysts predict that the formation of the next KRG cabinet will be delayed until after the Iraqi elections scheduled for September or October 2025. Although KDP President Masoud Barzani stated in January to Al-Shams TV that the cabinet formation should not extend beyond March, that deadline has now passed with little progress. A high-ranking PUK official recently informed local media that the new cabinet might not be formed until June or July.

A KDP source claims the PUK is deliberately stalling, aiming to pressure the KDP into concessions. They argue that PUK statements about an imminent agreement are tactical and misleading. Yet the KDP acknowledges that an agreement with the PUK is unavoidable. Without a genuine PUK partnership, the KDP believes Masrour Barzani cannot form a strong and functioning government. This has pushed the KDP to engage more seriously with the PUK.

The KDP also sees the PUK’s current political vulnerability—reflective of broader weakness within the Iran-aligned axis and potential shifts in Iraqi politics—as a critical moment to reach an agreement.

Outstanding Issues

One major sticking point remains: the PUK wants the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to be appointed jointly by parliament, with the government considered dissolved if either resigns. The KDP firmly rejects this condition.

According to informed sources, the KDP has conceded to several other PUK demands, including:

• Reducing the authority of the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff
• Expanding ministerial powers
• Limiting the Prime Minister’s Office’s intervention in ministerial affairs

This would mark a departure from the current cabinet’s practice, where ministers required approval from the Cabinet Office for most decisions. Under the new arrangement, ministers will operate with significantly more independence.

Position Allocation Methodology

While official discussions on position distribution have not yet taken place between the PUK and KDP, internal deliberations within both parties have explored various allocation frameworks:

The PUK is considering several distribution models:

• A point-based system assigning different values to positions (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, ministers)
• A column system grouping positions (Prime Minister with certain ministers in one column, Deputy Prime Minister with others in another)
• Classification of positions into tiered categories (Lists A, B, C)

The KDP favors:

• A hierarchical classification (A, B, C) of ministries based on importance and influence, with Category A including Interior, Finance, Natural Resources, Peshmerga, and Justice ministries

The following positions have been largely finalized:

• Prime Minister: KDP (Masrour Barzani)
• President of Kurdistan Region: KDP (Nechirvan Barzani)
• Deputy Prime Minister: PUK
• Deputy President: PUK
• Parliament Speaker: PUK
• Deputy Parliament Speaker: KDP
• Minister of Interior: KDP (non-negotiable)

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KDP Position Distribution

Regarding ministerial appointments, Masrour Barzani has been granted full authority to select and finalize all ministers—not only for KDP positions but also for PUK nominees. The PUK will be required to submit three candidates for each of their allocated ministerial positions, from which Masrour Barzani will make the final selection. However, the PUK may indicate its preferred candidate among the three nominees.

The KDP has declared no restrictions on ministerial allocations to the PUK except for the Ministry of Interior, which it insists on retaining. The party has even expressed willingness to cede the Ministry of Natural Resources to the PUK if necessary.

Both parties have agreed that all ministerial positions will be distributed exclusively between the KDP and PUK, with each party then free to allocate portions of their share to smaller political entities. From its allocation of more than ten ministries, the KDP plans to assign one ministerial position to the Turkmen community and another to the Christian component.

PUK’s Position Allocation and Internal Dynamics

Within the PUK, intense discussions continue regarding the distribution of their allocated positions. The party leadership is simultaneously managing both government position allocations and internal organizational restructuring. Party President Bafel Talabani is working to accommodate senior cadres’ aspirations, directing those seeking government positions to one track and those desiring party positions to another.

The position of Deputy Prime Minister has generated significant discussion within the PUK, as incumbent Qubad Talabani has repeatedly stated his unwillingness to continue in this role. During a February 22, 2025 meeting at the PUK Political Bureau in Sulaimani, Qubad Talabani explicitly told KDP delegation head Hoshyar Zebari not to expect his return to the Deputy Prime Minister position.

Nevertheless, KDP sources maintain confidence that Qubad Talabani will ultimately accept reappointment, citing the enhanced authority granted to the position under the new agreement. The Deputy Prime Minister will reportedly function as a de facto regional administrator for Sulaimani governorate with expanded powers. The KDP has expressed a strong preference for maintaining a member of the Talabani family in this critical position.

Should Qubad Talabani definitively decline the position, Imad Ahmed emerges as the most likely alternative, with Hawre Dara Sheikh Nuri as another potential candidate.

As per the KDP–PUK agreement, the President of the Kurdistan Region will have one deputy, a position reserved for the PUK. Derbaz Kosrat Rasul is considered the front-runner, though internal dynamics may affect the outcome. Jafar Sheikh Mustafa has also expressed interest, and the PUK leadership has sought to placate him by pledging to revive and empower his Supreme Interests Protection Council.

Additionally, the upcoming PUK congress is expected to install a deputy to party leader Bafel Talabani. This senior role is anticipated to go to the Kirkuk faction, with Rafat Abdullah as the likely appointee.

Final configuration of PUK senior roles may look as follows:

• Deputy President of the Region: Derbaz Kosrat Rasul
• Deputy Leader of the PUK: Rafat Abdullah (Kirkuki bloc)
• Head of the Supreme Interests Protection Council: Jafar Sheikh Mustafa (with expanded authority)

While earlier reports suggested the PUK might relinquish the Parliament Speaker position, it now appears the party will retain this role—the only presidency-level position allocated to the PUK apart from the Deputy President. A senior PUK source clarified that the party seeks to strengthen this position beyond its current configuration, where the Speaker cannot act independently without the Deputy Speaker and Secretary. The PUK aims to establish a more autonomous Speaker role comparable to the Prime Minister’s authority.

Shallaw Kosrat Rasul, a Political Bureau member, is considered the frontrunner for Speaker. However, if Derbaz Kosrat Rasul secures the Deputy President position, party convention would preclude allocating the Speakership to another member of the same family faction. In that scenario, Miran Mohammed – Bafel Talabani’s pick – would become the preferred candidate.

Masrour Barzani-Bafel Talabani Meetings

Bafel Talabani has met twice with Masrour Barzani in Pirmam (January 16 and March 16, 2025). According to KDP sources, during the second meeting, Talabani demonstrated serious commitment, proposing a unified approach toward Baghdad. He reportedly offered his full support, stating: “Let’s be one team with one policy toward Baghdad. I am prepared to leverage all my connections and authority to support you in Baghdad.”

Regarding government formation, Talabani suggested bypassing further formal negotiations, proposing that he and Barzani resolve all outstanding issues directly. This approach is feasible because the PUK leadership has granted Talabani comprehensive authority to finalize government agreements without requiring further consultation with the party’s Political Bureau.

The discussions also addressed the “My Account” initiative. Following Talabani’s inquiries about this program during their first meeting, Barzani arranged for the initiative’s team, led by Aziz Ahmed, to brief Talabani. This meeting apparently satisfied Talabani’s concerns, resolving potential friction over the program. The parties now intend to adopt it as a joint project, though the PUK’s suggestion to rename the initiative was rejected by the KDP.